Abstract. This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of "Theory of Mind", perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Such environments are represented here by multistage games of perfect information with randomly chosen outcomes. "Theory of Mind" then yields a sharp, unambiguous advantage over less sophisticated, behavioral approaches to strategic interaction. In related experiments, we show the subscale for social skills in standard tests for autism is a highly significant determinant of the speed of learning in such games.
Introduction
An individual with theory of mind (ToM ) has the ability to conceive of himself, and of others, as having agency, and so to attribute to himself and others mental states such as belief, desire, knowledge, and intent. It is generally accepted in psychology that human beings beyond early infancy possess ToM. More specifically, it is conventional in game theory to make the crucial assumption, without much apology, that agents have ToM in the sense of imputing preferences to others.
The present paper considers ToM in greater depth by addressing the question: Why and how might have such an ability evolved? In what types of environments would ToM yield a distinct advantage over alternative, less sophisticated, approaches to strategic interaction? In general terms, the answer we propose is that ToM is an evolutionary adaptation for dealing with strategic environments that have a persistent element of novelty.
The argument made here in favor of theory of mind is a substantial generalization and reformulation of the argument in Robson (2001) concerning the advantage of having an own utility function in a non-strategic setting. In that paper, an own utility function permits an optimal response to novelty. Suppose an agent has experienced all of the possible outcomes, but has not experienced and does not know the probabilities with which these are combined. This latter element introduces the requisite novelty. If the agent has the biologically appropriate utility function, she can learn the correct gamble to take; conversely, if she acts correctly over a sufficiently rich set of gambles, she must possess, although perhaps only implicitly, the appropriate utility function.
We shift focus here to a dynamic model in which players repeatedly interact with one another but in which the set of games that they might face becomes larger and larger with time. We presume individuals have an appropriate own utility function. The focus is then on the advantage to an agent of conceiving of her opponents as rational actors-as having preferences, in particular, and understanding that they act optimally in the light of these. Having a template into which the preferences of an opponent can be fitted enables a player to deal with a higher rate of innovation than can a behavioral type of individual that adapts to each game as a distinct set of circumstances. In other words, the edge to ToM derives from a capacity to extrapolate to novel circumstances information that was learned about preferences in a specific case.
The distinction between the ToM and behavioral types might usefully be illustrated with reference to the following observations of vervet monkeys (Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) , p. 213). If two groups are involved in a skirmish, sometimes a member of the losing side is observed to make a warning cry used by vervets to signal the approach of a leopard. All the vervets will then urgently disperse, saving the day for the losing combatant. The issue is: What is the genesis of this deceptive behavior? One possibility, corresponding to our theory of mind type, is that the deceptive vervet appreciates what the effect of such a cry would be on the others, understands that is, that they are averse to a leopard attack and exploits this aversion deliberately. The other polar extreme corresponds to our behavioral adaptive learners. Such a type has no model whatever of the other monkeys' preferences and beliefs. His alarm cry behavior conditions simply on the circumstance that he is losing a fight. By accident perhaps, he once made the leopard warning in such a circumstance and it had a favorable outcome. Subsequent reapplication of this strategy continued to be met with success, reinforcing the behavior.
Consider the argument in greater detail. We begin by fixing a game tree with perfect information, with stages i 1 , ..., I. There are I equally large populations, one for each of the associated "player roles." In each period, a large number of random matches are made, with each match having one player in each role i 1 , .., I. The outcomes needed to complete the game are drawn randomly and uniformly in each period from a finite outcome set. Each player has a preference ordering over the entire infinite set of possible outcomes. Each player is fully aware of his own ordering but does not directly know the preference ordering of his opponents.
Occasionally, a new outcome is added to the outcome set, where each new outcome is drawn independently from a given distribution. The number of outcomes available grows to infinity at a parametric rate. We use this device of a growing outcome set as a simple way of deriving the comparative rates at which the various behavioral types learn.
All players are given the full history of the games played-the outcomes that were chosen, and the choices that were made by all player roles. The types of players here differ with respect to the extent and the manner of utilization of this information.
We compare two main categories of types of players-naive and theory-of-mind (ToM ) types. The ToM types are disposed to learn others' preferences. They apply the information provided by the history available in each period to build up a detailed picture of the preferences of the other roles. The naive types are characterized by reinforcement learning, and treat each new game as a unfamiliar set of circumstances. All types are assumed to avail themselves of a dominant choice in the subgame they start, whenever such a dominant choice is available. This assumption is in the spirit of focussing on the learning the preferences of others rather than considering the implications of knowing one's own preferences.
The crucial aspect of the ToM behavior is that, in the long run, once the history of the game has revealed the preferences of all subsequent players, they map these preferences to an action. There is a particular ToM type, the SPE-ToM type, who maps these preferences to the SPE choice for the subgame. This SPE-ToM type is shown to evolutionarily dominate the population, in the long run. In the short run, the ToM types understand enough about the game that they can learn the preferences of other player roles. For example, it is common knowledge among all ToM types that all players use dominant actions, if available.
The crucial feature of naive types is simply that they play the same strategy in response to any new game. Even if the naive types are ultra-fast learners, and use the SPE strategy the second time a game is played, as is usually literally impossible, they will still lose the evolutionary race here to the SPE-ToM type. More reasonable assumptions on the rate of learning for the naive types would only strengthen our results. This characterization of naive types is in line with "evolutionary game theory," which was inspired, in turn, by the psychological theory of reinforcement learning.
Another simplification is that we assume that the ToM types do not avail themselves of the transitivity of opponents' preferences. The ToM types build up a description of others' preferences only by learning all the pairwise choices. Again, relaxing this assumption would only strengthen our results.
Theorem 1 is the basic result here-in an intermediate range of growth rates of the outcome set, the ToM types will learn opponents' preferences with a probability that converges to one, while the naive types see a familiar game with a probability that converges to zero. The greater adaptation of the ToM type simply reflects that there are vastly more possible games that can be generated from a given number of outcomes than there are outcome pairs.
In principle, there are various ways the ToM types might exploit this greater knowledge at the expense of the naive types. We have set up the model to favor a simple and salient possibility, as expressed as the main result in Theorem 2-that the unique SPE is attained, with the SPE-ToM type ultimately dominant, over all other ToM types, as well as over all the naive types.
We also report here closely related experiments on Theory of Mind that buttress the current approach. In these experiments, we fix the outcome set, rather than allow this to grow over time. Also for simplicity, we consider only two-stage games where each player role has two moves at each decision node. As is the crucial feature of the theoretical model, all players in a given role had the same (induced) preferences, and players knew only their own payoff at each outcome and not that of their opponent. We randomly and anonymously paired subjects in each of 90 repetitions to observe the ability of players 1 to learn (and exploit knowledge of) the preferences of players 2.
Our design alleviates two potential confounds which arise in this setting. First, such a game might have a dominant strategy for player 1; any such game provides no opportunity for the experimenter to infer whether player 1 has learned player 2's preferences. Second, there are some such two stage games where a simple "highest mean" rule of thumb adequately guides player 1-choose between your two actions based on a 50-50 expectation of the resulting payoffs for you. Before player 1 has observed any of player 2's choices, this rule of thumb will be indeed be optimal, given that players' preferences are uncorrelated. This is because player 2 will randomize 50-50 from player 1's perspective. To get greater mileage from the experiments, we thus divided each experimental session into three treatments designed to gradually eliminate these confounds by varying the outcome set from which games were drawn. The four outcomes in the first treatment were chosen in an unconstrained way so dominant strategies did sometimes arise and the rule of thumb sometimes gave the right choice. The outcomes in the second treatment were chosen so that dominant strategies could not arise but the rule of thumb still sometimes worked. The outcomes in the third treatment, which comprised 2/3 of the session, were chosen so that the rule of thumb never gave the right answer (and thus there were also no dominant strategies). Thus, the final 60 periods provide a particularly difficult setting in which the only way to perform well in the role of player 1 is to learn the preferences of player 2.
At the end of each experimental session, we asked the students to complete two short multiple-choice surveys measuring autism. One was the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) survey; the other was the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAP). Of particular relevance here is the subscale on each of these two tests that rates social skills (Social Skills -in the BAP and Aloofness in the AQ).
The results of the experiments were striking. First, we observed statistically and quantitatively significant learning of player 2 preferences by players 1. This learning is evident during the third treatment when the rule of thumb cannot work. Second, a particularly salient finding was that player 1's with lower scores on the social subscales (i.e. players who exhibit greater social skills) were highly likely (with p=0.01) to learn player 2's choices faster.
These experiments corroborate the present approach on two grounds. In the first place, the theoretical model apparently captures important features of real world decision-making. To ascribe preferences to an opponent and to endeavor to learn these, to one's own advantage, is a real world ability, and one that is present to a varying extent in individuals. Secondly, correlations between behavior in the experiment and survey measures of autism spectrum suggest that preference learning ability in strategic settings is closely tied to a central aspect of theory of mind, as this term is used in psychology.
The Theoretical Model

The Environment.
We begin by defining the underlying games. The extensive game form is a fixed tree with perfect information and a finite number of stages, I ¥ 2 and actions, A, at each decision node. 1 There is one "player role" for each such stage, i 1 , ..., I, in the game. Each player role is represented by an equally large population of agents. These agents may have different "strategic types", in a way that is described below, but all such types have identical payoff functions. To describe the basic elements of the game, all that matters, then, is how each player role maps outcomes to expected offspring. Independently in each period, all players are randomly and uniformly matched with exactly one player for each role in each of the resulting large number of games. 2 There is a fixed overall set of outcomes, each with consequences for the reproductive success of the I types of agents. Player role i 1 , . . . , I is then characterized by a function mapping outcomes to expected numbers of offspring. A fundamental novelty is that, although each player role knows its own payoff at each outcome, it does not know the payoff for the other player roles.
For notational simplicity, however, we finesse consideration of explicit outcomes and payoff functions from outcomes to expected offspring. Given a fixed tree structure with T terminal nodes, we instead simply identify each outcome with a payoff vector and each game with a particular set of such payoff vectors assigned to the terminal nodes.
A1:
The set of all games is represented by Q rm, M s T I , for M ¡ m ¡ 0 . That is, each outcome is a payoff vector in Z rm, M s I , with one component for each player role, and there are T such outcomes comprising each game.
Let t 1 , 2 , . . . , denote successive time periods. At date t, there is available a set of outcomes Z t Z, determined in the following way. There is an initial finite set of outcomes Z 1 Z where each of these outcomes is drawn independently from Z according to a cumulative distribution function F as follows. 3
A2:
The cdf over outcomes F has a continuous probability density f that is strictly positive on Z. 1 The restriction that each node induce the same number of actions, A, can readily be relaxed by allowing equivalent moves, in which case A can be interpreted as the maximum number of actions available at any node in the entire tree. Indeed, it is possible to allow the game tree to be randomly chosen. This would not fundamentally change the nature of our results but would considerably add to the notation required. 2 Uniform matching is not crucial to our results but chosen in the interest of simplicity.
There is then a subsequence of time periods tt k u V k1 . At date t k , k 1 , 2 , . . . , a k-th outcome is added to the existing ones by drawing it independently from Z according to F . 4 In between arrival dates the set of outcomes is fixed, and once an outcome is introduced it is available thereafter. The available set of outcomes in period t is then Z 1 tz 1 , . . . , z k u , whenever t k ¤ t t k 1 , where z k Z denotes the introduced outcome at arrival date t k .
We parameterize the rate at which the environment becomes increasingly complex in a fashion that yields a straightforward connection between this rate and the advantages to theory of mind.
A3: Fix α ¥ 0 . The arrival date sequence tt k u satisfies, for each k 1 , 2 , . . . , t k tp|Z 1 | kq α u. 5 Consider now a convenient formal description of the set of games available at each date.
Definition 1: At date t, the empirical cdf based on sampling, with equal probabilities, from the outcomes that are actually available at date t, is denoted by the random function F t pzq where z rm, M s I . Similarly, the empirical cdf of games at date t is denoted by G t pqq, where q Q rm, M s IT . 6 The set of games available at date t is denoted by Q t .
We suppose that, at each date t, an extensive form game denoted q t is drawn at random from Q t -uniformly and independently from the sequence of previously realized games. The players in each match then independently play q t . Players of each 4 This abbreviated way of modeling outcomes introduces the apparent complication that the same payoff for role i might be associated with multiple possible payoffs for the remaining players. Knowing your own payoff does not then imply knowing the outcome. This issue could be addressed by supposing that there is a unique label attached to each payoff vector, and that each player role observes this label, as well as his payoff. However, given that the cdf F is continuous, the probability of any role's payoff arising more than once is zero. Each player i can then safely assume that a given payoff is associated to a unique outcome and a unique vector of other roles' payoffs.
We do not consider how ToM types might update beliefs about opponents' payoffs in the light of their own observed payoff. All that we rely on is that, if history establishes another player role's preference between two outcomes for sure, then the ToM types learn. All that we rely on concerning the naive types is that they can only learn from repeated exposure to a given game. 5 Here t¤u denotes the floor function. It seems more plausible, perhaps, that these arrival dates would be random. This makes the analysis mathematically more complex, but does not seem to fundamentally change the results. The present assumption is then in the interests of simplicity. 6 Note that Ft and Gt are random variables measurable with respect to the information available at date t, in particular the set of available outcomes Zt. strategic type within a given player role are constrained to use the same strategy. For simplicity, indeed, the ToM types are ultimately constrained to use pure strategies. 7 The cdf's F t and G t are well-behaved in the limit. This result is elegant and so warrants inclusion here. First note that the distribution of games implied by the cdf on outcomes, F is given by G, say, which is the cdf on the payoff space rm, M s IT generated by T independent choices of outcomes distributed according to F . Clearly, G also has a continuous pdf g that is strictly positive on rm, M s IT . These cdf's are then the limits of the cdf's F t and G tLemma 1: It follows that F t pzq Ñ F pzq and G t pqq Ñ Gpqq with probability one, and uniformly in z rm, M s I , or in q rm, M s IT , respectively.
Proof. This follows directly from the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem. (See Billingsley, p. 275, and Eike, Pollard and Stute, p. 825, for its extension to many dimensions). The evolutionary bottom line is then as follows-each I-tuple playing each game generate children according to the outcome obtained. The current generation then dies and their offspring become the next generation of players. The offspring of each type of i player become i players of the same type in the following period. We normalize the number of children born to each type of i player by dividing this number by the total number of offspring produced by all players in role i.
We turn now to consideration of the "strategic types" within each player role.
Strategic Types.
We allow a finite number of different "strategic types" within each role. When making a choice at date t every player is informed of a publicly observed history H t tZ t , pq 1 , π 1 q, . . . , pq t¡1 , π t¡1 qu, and the game q t drawn in the current period.
The history records the outcomes available at date t, the randomly drawn games up to the previous period, and the empirical distributions of choices made by previous generations. 8 In particular, for each player role i decision-node h that is reached by a positive fraction of players in period τ , π τ phq ∆pAq records the aggregate behavior of date τ i player roles at h. Let H t be the set of date t histories, and H t¥1 H t . 7 That is, the ToM types use pure strategies when they know the preferences of all the subsequent players. This is a harmless simplification, since the ToM type that will prevail in the long run is a pure strategy in these circumstances. Naive types are assumed to mix uniformly when the game is new. 8 Although each player observes the previous games in the sense of seeing the outcomes assigned to each terminal node, as revealed by the payoff she is assigned at that node, it should be emphasized that she does not observe other roles' payoffs directly.
Recall that in each period t, every extensive form in Q t shares the same underlying game tree. Then, let Σ i denote the set of strategies available to the player role i's of any given date.
We partition each player role population into groups differing with respect to strategic types. Specifically, for each i 1 , . . . , I, there is a finite set of functions C i tc : H ¢ Q ÝÑ Σ i u . These are the i player strategic types. Each i player is associated with a c C i , which determines his choice of strategy. Moreover, we assume these types are inheritable. Specifically, an individual in period t with strategic type c chooses the strategy cpH t , q t q in game q t , his children choose cpH t 1 , q t 1 q in q t 1 , his grandchildren choose cpH t 2 , q t 2 q, and so on. Variation in strategic types allows for different levels of sophistication within each player role. Some of these types are players who see others as having agency, other types do not see this.
As part of the specification of the map c, we assume that all individuals choose a strictly dominant action in the subgame they initiate, whenever such an action is available. For example, the player at the last stage of the game always chooses the outcome that she strictly prefers. This general assumption is in the spirit of focussing upon the implications of other players payoffs rather than the implications of one's own payoffs. This assumption incorporates an element of sequential rationality, since such a dominant strategy is conditional upon having reached the node in question, that is, conditional on the previous history of the game. 9
To be more precise, the assumption is-A4: Consider any i player role, and an i player subgame q. The action a at q is dominant for i if for every action a I $ a, for every outcome z available in the continuation game after i's choice of a in q, and every outcome z I available in the continuation game after i's choice of a I in q, z i ¡ z I i . For each i 1 , . . . , I, every strategic type in C i always chooses any such dominant action. When indifferent between several courses of action a player mixes evenly between these actions.
We assume there are two main categories of types of playersNaive players. We adopt a relaxed concept of naivete, which serves to make the ultimate results stronger. The only additional requirement on the map c is that a naive player must choose a fixed arbitrary strategy whenever the game is novel. For specificity, suppose naive players in this situation mix uniformly over all available actions.
9 Given suitable noise, this element of sequential rationality is assured, and this property can be made a result rather than an assumption. That is, a strategy that did not use a dominant choice would be driven to extinction under any plausible evolutionary dynamic. We omit this proof for conciseness.
(Naive players also choose any strictly dominant action in the remaining subgame, as in A4.) Although it is highly implausible, we could indeed allow naive players to play the SPE strategy that is appropriate for the underlying unknown preferences of subsequent players, in the second repetition of each game. This is highly implausible since it is not generally possible to deduce the payoffs that rapidly and neither could convergence to an SPE once preferences are known but other agents make non-SPE choices be that rapid. Nevertheless, even if the naive players are ultra-fast learners, the sophisticated ToM players will out-compete them, given only the naive players' inability to adapt in any way to a new game. To the extent that naive players fail to be such ultra-fast learners, our results would simply be strengthened.
Consider now a category of Theory of Mind strategic types. Intuitively, these types conceive of opponents as making choices according to well defined preferences and beliefs. All of the ToM types need not agree at the outset about what these preference orderings are, but they all know there are some preferences influencing j players' choices in every period, and they learn what these preference are.
Theory of Mind Players.
What this means precisely is as follows. The important long run aspect of the behavior of these ToM types is that, if the history of the game has revealed the preferences of all subsequent players, perhaps in the way that is described in detail below, these ToM types map these preferences into an action. In particular, in every role, there is a positive fraction of a special type of ToM called SPE -ToM which plays a subgame perfect equilibrium action given these known preferences of subsequent players. Recall that, as part of the map c, ToM players choose any strictly dominant action in the remaining subgame, as in A4. In the short run, in order to learn others' preferences, it is important that all the ToM players know that all other players also use dominant actions if available, as in A4; further, this is common knowledge among the ToM players. The presence of some ToM players in every role is also common knowledge among all the ToM types.
The assumptions here on the ToM types are relatively weak. For example, the assumption that ToM types have common knowledge that all types choose a dominant action is in the spirit of focussing here on the implications of the preferences of others, while presuming full use of one's own preferences. Further, it is merely for expositional clarity that we describe the short run learning behavior of the ToM types in terms of common knowledge. The entire description can be recast in pure "revealed preference" terms. How this can be done is discussed after the statement of Theorem 1.
We can now describe the strategic environment as follows
where the new variable is M i1 giving the initial distribution of strategic types in player role i. Recall that I and A describe the fixed game tree, F is the distribution on Z rm, M s I over introduced outcomes, and α governs the rate of introduction of novel outcomes.
The Theoretical Results.
There are two main theoretical results. The first shows that the ToM types learn the preferences of other roles, so these become common knowledge among all ToM types in all roles. The second shows how the ToM s might exploit this knowledge by playing the SPE of the game.
Definition 2:
The history H t reveals players in role i strictly prefer z to z I if for all E satisfying A4 whenever H t occurs it becomes common knowledge among ToMs that
The notion is well defined. In particularLemma 2: Suppose A4 holds and that there are ToMs in every role i ¡ 1 . Then for every finite subset X Z there exists a finite history H H such that for each j I, and z, z I X, if z j ¡ z I j , then H reveals players in role j strictly prefer z to z I . Now, for each i 1 , . . . , I, let L it denote the fraction of pairs pz, z I q Z t ¢Z t where H t reveals i's favored outcome between tz, z I u. 10 To evaluate the performance of the naive players, let γ t be the fraction of games (of those in Q t ) that have been played previously at date t. Let T ¥ 4 be the number of terminal nodes in the fixed game tree. 11 It follows that T is the cut-off point for the naive types. We then have the following key result that sets the stage for establishing the evolutionary dominance of the SPE -ToM 's over all other playersTheorem 1: Suppose E satisfies assumptions A1-A4. If α 2 , then L it surely converges to zero, i 1 , . . . , I. If α T , then γ t surely converges to zero. On the other hand, if α ¡ T , then γ t converges in probability to one. If α ¡ 2 , and additionally A4 holds, then L it converges in probability to one for each i 1 , . . . , I. This is proved in the Appendix. This result says that if α ¡ 2 , and, in particular, if all types adopt strictly dominant acts, whenever these are available, where the ToM s have common knowledge that this is true, then all preferences are revealed in the limit to the ToM s. This is the crucial result here, since if, at the same time, α T , all the naive players see new games essentially always and mix uniformly, in a way that is generally inappropriate. 12 An intuitive description of how the ToM types learn preferences is useful. Consider a ToM type in a particular player role j ¡ 1 . The argument that this type can obtain the preferences of subsequent player roles proceeds by backwards induction on these subsequent roles. Players in the last role choose a preferred action and this is revealed in the choices that j ¡ 1 sees. A player in role j also knows that all ToM types in all roles now know this as well. Eventually a complete picture of player 1 's preference can be built up as common knowledge among all the ToM types. As the induction hypothesis, suppose the preferences of i ¡ 2 , . . . , 1 for i ¤ j have been established as common knowledge among the ToM types. We need to show that j can similarly obtain the preferences of i ¡ 1 . Suppose then that a game is drawn in which player role i ¡ 1 in fact has a dominant action, a, say, after which i ¡ 2 has a dominant action, after which i ¡ 3 has a dominant action, after which... Furthermore, there is another action, a I , say, that i ¡ 1 could take, after which again i ¡ 2 has a dominant action, after which... Player j knows the situation faced by i ¡ 2 , ..., 1 . Since, in fact, players in role i ¡ 1 have a dominant action, all types take this. Player j can see that all i ¡ 1 's have made the same choice, so that the ToM s there who made this choice must then prefer the outcome induced by a to the outcome induced by a I . Eventually, ToM j ¥ i can build up a complete picture of the preferences of the role i ¡ 1 . 13 This description of learning shows how the common knowledge assumptions concerning the ToM types can be stripped to their bare revealed preference essentials. It is unimportant, that is, what the ToM types think, in any literal sense. All that matters is that it is as if the ToM s in roles i, ..., I add to their knowledge of role i ¡1's preferences in the circumstances considered above. Once a ToM type in role i, for example, has experienced all of role i ¡1 binary choices being put to the test like this, given that this is already true for roles i ¡ 2 , ..., 1 , this role i ToM type can map the preferences for subsequent players to an action.
All that remains then, to complete the argument, is to show that the ToM types will do better than the naive types by exploiting their knowledge of all other players' preferences, while the naive types are overwhelmed by novel games. This will be true in a variety of circumstances; for simplicity, we focus on assumptions that yield the generically unique SPE.
We now have the main resultTheorem 2: Consider an environment, E , satisfying assumptions A1-A4. Suppose that there are a finite number of types-naive and ToM, one of which is the SPE-ToM. Suppose further that every alternative to the SPE-ToM, that is a also a ToM type, differs from the SPE-ToM at every reached decision node in a set of games that arises with positive probability under the distribution F . If α p2, T q, then the proportion of SPE-ToM in role i, R it , say, tends to 1 in probability, i 2 , ..., I. Note that we focus here on the case that α p2, T q. 14 
Experiments on Theory of Mind
Experimental Design.
We report here the results of experiments that are simplified versions of the theoretical model. These test the ability of individuals to learn the preferences of others through repeated interaction and to use that information strategically to their advantage. The game tree is a two-stage extensive form where each player has two choices at each decision node.
There are then two player roles, 1 and 2. Player roles differ in their position in the game tree and their (induced) preferences, but all players of a given role have identical preferences. In each period, each role 1 participant is randomly and anonymously matched with a single role 2 participant to play a two-stage extensive form game, as depicted in figure C1 , in appendix C. We employ this matching scheme to at least diminish the likelihood of supergame effects. In each game, role 1 players always move first, choosing one of two intermediate nodes (displayed in the figure as blue circles), and then based on that decision, the role 2 player chooses a terminal node that determines payoffs for each participant (displayed in the figure as a pair of boxes).
14 If α 2 , the ToM players are also overwhelmed with novelty. The ToM s may still outperform the naive players, but this depends on the detailed behavior of the ToM s when facing games in which the payoffs of other players are unknown. In the case that α ¡ T , the relative performance of the two types depends on the detailed behavior of the naive players.
If the naive players are ultra-fast learners, and play an SPE strategy the second time they encounter a given game, they might keep up with the ToM s. More realistically, they would not learn so quickly, and so would lag the ToM s.
When making their decisions, participants only observe their own payoff at each outcome and are originally uninformed of the payoff for the other participant. Instead, they know only that payoff pairs are consistent over time. That is, whenever the payoff for role 1 is X, the payoff to role 2 will always be the same number Y. In figure C1 , which is shown from the perspective of a role 1 participant, his own payoff at each terminal node is shown in the orange box, while his counterpart's payoff is displayed as a "?". Similarly, when role 2 players make their decisions, they only observe their own payoffs and see a "?" for their counterpart (see figure C2 ).
In each period, the payoffs at each terminal node are drawn without replacement randomly from a finite set of V payoff pairs. Each pair of payoffs is unique, guaranteeing a strict preference ordering over outcomes. This set is fixed in the experiments in contrast to its growth in the theoretical model. We do not then attempt to study the theoretical long run in the experiments, but content ourselves with observing the rate of learning of opponents' preferences. Allowing for the strategic equivalence of games in which the two payoff pairs at a given terminal node are presented in reverse order, there are
2¨{ 2 strategically distinct games that can be generated from V payoff pairs, each of which has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Thus, as in the theoretical model, despite their initial ignorance of their counterpart's preferences, role 1 players can learn about these preferences over time, by observing how role 2 players respond to various choices presented to them in the repetitions of the game. If role 1 players correctly learn role 2 players' preferences, they can increase their own payoff by choosing the SPE action. On the face of it, role 1 players have then developed a theory of a role 2 player's mind.
This suggests investigating whether role 1 players choose in a manner that is increasingly consistent with the SPE. Initial pilot sessions revealed two issues with this strategy: 1) many of the randomly generated games include dominant strategies for player 1, which are not informative for inferring capacity to learn the preferences of others, as indeed reflected in the theoretical model, and 2) more subtly, there is a simple "highest mean" rule of thumb that also often generates SPE play. Consider a player 1 who is initially uncertain about player 2's preferences. From the point of view of player 1, given independence of player 2's preferences, player 2 is equally likely to choose each terminal node, given player 1's choice. The expected payoff maximizing strategy is to choose the intermediate node at which the average of potential terminal payoffs is highest. Indeed, our pilot sessions suggested that many participants followed this strategy, which was relatively successful.
For these reasons, we used a 3x1 within-subjects experimental design that, over the course of an experimental session, pares down the game set to exclude the games in which choice is too simple to be informative. Specifically, each session included games drawn from 7 payoff pairs (so there are 105 possible games). In seven of our sessions, payoff possibilities for each participant consisted of integers between 1 and 7, and in our final two sessions the set was {1,2,3,4,8,9 ,10}. 15 The one exception was our first session which used only 6 payoff pairs, where payoffs were integers between 1 and 6. 16 Each session lasted for 90 periods in which, in the first 15 periods, the game set included 15 randomly chosen games from the set Q. Starting in the 16th period, we eliminate all games in which player 1 has a dominant strategy, and the next 15 periods consist of games randomly drawn from this subset of Q. Finally, starting in the 31st period, we also eliminate all games in which the optimal strategy under the "highest mean" rule of thumb corresponds to the SPE of the game, and our final 60 periods consist of randomly drawn games from this smaller subset. Thus, our final 60 periods make it harder for player 1 to achieve high payoffs, since the only effective strategy is to learn the preferences of the role 2 players.
One potential issue with our design is that learning would be disrupted by the presence of any role 2 player who fails to choose his dominant action. For this reason, we considered automating the role 2 player. However, on reflection, this design choice seems untenable. In the instructions, we would need to explain that algorithmic players 2 maximize their payoffs in each stage, which would eliminate all but the mechanics of the inference problem faced by player 1-in essence the instructions would be providing the theory of mind.
A second potential concern is that foregone payoffs (due to role 1 player's choice) may lead to non-rational behavior by some player 2s. Such behavior involves role 2 players solving a difficult inference problem. A spiteful (or altruistic) player 2, who wanted to punish (or reward) player 1 on the basis of player 2's foregone payoffs, first must infer that player 1 has learned player 2's preferences and then infer player 1's own preferences on the basis of this assumption. Player 2 could then, given his options, choose the higher or lower of the two payoffs for player 1 as either punishment or reward. However, players 2 chose their dominant action roughly 90% of the time, which suggests that these sources of error were not a prominent feature of our experiment.
We related our results directly to theory of mind, as this is measured by two short survey instruments. At the conclusion of the experiment, participants completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) survey designed by Baron-Cohen [1] , since autism spectrum reflects varying degrees of inability to "read" others' minds. This short survey has been shown to correlate with clinical diagnoses of autism spectrum disorders, but it is not used for clinical purposes. Participants also completed the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAP) due to Hurley [5] , which provides a similar measure of autism spectrum behavior. With this additional data we will be able to evaluate how each participant's ability to perform as player 1 in our experiments correlates with two other well-known ToM metrics. Copies of the questionnaires are available in Appendices D and E.
We report data from 11 experimental sessions with a total of 86 participants (43 in each role). Each experimental session consisted of 6-10 participants, recruited from the student body of Simon Fraser University. Participants entered the lab and were seated at visually isolated computer terminals where they privately read self-paced instructions. A monitor was available to privately answer any questions about the instructions. After reading the instructions, if there were no additional questions, the experiment began. Instructions are available in Appendix B.
Each experimental session took between 90 and 120 minutes. At the conclusion of each session, participants were paid privately in cash equal to their payoffs from two (2) randomly chosen periods. We use this protocol to increase the salience of each individual decision, thereby inducing participants to treat each game as payoffrelevant. For each chosen period, the payoff from that period was multiplied by 2 or 3 (depending on the session) and converted to CAD. Average salient experimental earnings were $27.22, with a maximum of $45 and a minimum of $13. In addition to their earnings from the two randomly chosen periods, participants also received $7 for arriving to the experiment on time. Upon receiving payment, participants were dismissed.
Experimental Results.
Since the decision problem is trivial for player 2, our analysis focuses entirely on decisions by player 1. We focus on the probability with which player 1 chose an action consistent with the SPE of the game. For a given game tree, and with repeated play with fixed matching and private information about individual payoffs, it is known that pairs frequently converge to non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes over time [4, 6] . In such a setting, an individual merely need learn her counterpart's preferences over two pairwise comparisons. Our setting is more strategically complex, and hence we are able to observe heterogeneity in ToM capabilities and exploit this in our data analysis. First, we describe overall learning trends and we show that learning is correlated with both Autism Quotient and Broad Autism Phenotype scores. Finally, we analyze individual rates of learning and show that learning speed is highly correlated with AQ and BAP subscales associated with social skills.
3.2.1. Overall Averages. Figure 1 displays a time series of the probability that player 1 chose an action consistent with knowledge of player 2's preferences (i.e. consistent with SPE) over the 90 periods of the experiment. After 15 periods, the game set no longer included instances where player 1 had a dominant strategy. After 30 periods, the game set no longer included instances where player 1 would choose correctly by following the "highest mean" rule of thumb. At period 31, when subjects enter the NoDominant/NoHeuristic treatment, there is a significant downtick in player 1's performance, but afterwards there is a notable upward trend in the probability of player 1 choosing optimally. Table 1 reports linear probability panel regressions where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if player 1 chose an action consistent with the SPE of the game and 0 otherwise. We include treatment dummies for periods 1-15 and periods 16-30 to control for the game set. We also include an individual's AQ score in column (2) and BAP score in column (3) to investigate the effect of autism spectrum scores on learning rates. Higher scores on both instruments indicate increasing presence of autism spectrum behaviors. We include random effects for each subject to control for repeated measures, and we cluster standard errors at the session level. The positive and significant estimated coefficient on Period indicates that participants are increasingly likely to choose optimally over time. Thus, even in this complex setting, individuals are able to learn the preferences of others. Positive and significant coefficients on the treatment dummy variables support our decision to screen out the games with dominant and highest mean rule of thumb strategies. Moreover, negative and significant estimated coefficients on the AQ and BAP scores provide the first evidence that our games reflect ToM as implicated in autism. A one standard deviation increase in AQ score is associated with a 4.1 percentage point reduction in the probability of choosing optimally, on average. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in BAP score is associate with a 3.2 percentage point reduction. We summarize these findings below:
Finding 1: On average, there is a significant increase in understanding of others' preferences over time, despite individual variation.
Finding 2:
This increase in learning is correlated with the AQ and BAP questionnaires.
Individual Heterogeneity in Learning Rates.
Our finding that the AQ and BAP scores are correlated with average performance is suggestive, but the most important aspect of ToM in our setting is learning the preferences of others. The faster player 1 learns the preferences of role 2 players, the higher his payoff. Hence, we now turn our attention to heterogeneity in individual learning rates. In particular, we explore the relationship between individuals' learning rates in our experiment and their AQ and BAP scores.
To estimate individual learning rates for each player 1 we estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when the player chose a node consistent with SPE and 0 otherwise and the independent variable is a period trend and a constant term. We exclude all games with dominant strategies and all games in which the "highest mean" rule of thumb yields the SPE choice. The coefficient on the period trend, β, provides an estimate of each individual's rate of learning. We them compute simple correlation coefficients of individual βs and measures of ToM from the AQ and BAP questionnaires. Recall that on both instruments, a higher score indicates increased presence of more autism spectrum behaviors. Thus, negative correlations will indicate that our rate of learning measure provides similar information to the AQ and BAP surveys, while the absence of correlation or positive correlations will indicate that ToM in strategic environments differs from ToM in other social contexts. Table 2 reports these simple correlations between estimated β's and various measures of autism spectrum intensity, and we include 90% confidence intervals for the correlation coefficients. To indicate what portion of the variance in learning rates is attributable to differences in autism spectrum scores, we also report R 2 estimates from separate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an individual's estimated β and the independent variable is an individual's score on a particular scale or sub-scale of the AQ and BAP questionnaires.
From the table, we can see that learning rates are correlated with average AQ and BAP scores, and this provides additional evidence that our games measure ToM . However, most striking is the strong correlation between learning rates and the two subscales that emphasize social skills: AQ Social and BAP Aloof. In particular, these scales are concerned with the extent to which individuals understand and enjoy social interaction. One particularly telling item on the AQ Social subscale asks individuals how strongly they agree with the statement:
"I find it difficult to work out people's intentions."
This is precisely the idea of ToM in a strategic setting.
Learning is also correlated with the AQ Imagin subscale which measures "imagination" by asking respondents to what degree they enjoy/understand fiction and fictional characters. One question asks about the ability to impute motives to fictional characters, which suggests some overlap with the AQ Social subscale. Most of the other subscales exhibit negative but insignificant correlation coefficients. Interestingly, the two subscales that exhibit non-negative coefficients (BAP Rigid and AQ Detail) emphasize precision in individual habits and attention to detail. In a strategic setting such as ours, these traits might be expected to partly counteract the negative effects of other typical ToM deficits, perhaps accounting for the lack of correlation. Importantly, our survey data reveal measured ToM in the normal range. Thus, differences in the strategic aspects of ToM vary significantly across individuals in the normal range of social intelligence. Figure 2 displays histograms of AQ and BAP scores over the range of feasible scores.
Finding 3: Individual learning is highly correlated with the social skills subscales of the AQ and BAP questionnaires. 
Conclusions
This paper presents a theoretical model of the evolution of theory of mind. The model demonstrates the advantages to predicting opponents' behavior in simple games of perfect information. A departure from standard game theory is to allow the outcomes used in the game to be randomly selected from a growing outcome set. We show how sophisticated individuals who recognize agency in others can build up a picture of others' preferences while naive players who react only to the complete game remain in the dark. We impose plausible conditions under which sophisticated individuals who choose the SPE action will dominate all other types of individual, sophisticated or naive, in the long run.
We then perform experiments measuring the ability of individuals to learn the preferences of others in a strategic setting. The experiments implement a simplified version of the theoretical model, using a two-stage game where each decision node involves two choices. We find 1) evidence of significant learning over time, and 2) strong correlations between behavior in these experiments and responses to two well-known survey instruments measuring ToM from psychology, thus justifying the use of the term "theory of mind" in the present context. We show, in particular, that there is a highly significant correlation between the social skill subscales on standard short tests for autism and the rate at which player 1's learn player 2's preferences. A1-A4 will be assumed throughout without further mention.
We first establish (in Lemma 3 below) the negative claims of Theorem 1, that is, we consider first arrival rates of novelty for which either L it or γ t converge to zero. After this, the positive claim of Theorem 1 will be proved. ii) Recall there are T terminal nodes. If α r0, T q, then γ t ÝÑ 0 surely.
Proof. Consider any environment in which the underlying game tree has T end-nodes.
Clearly L it ¤ t ¤ T {|Z t | 2 everywhere, since the maximal number of binary preference orderings that can be revealed for any player at any date is bounded above by T . Similarly, since only one game is played in a period,
Surely |Z t | ÝÑ V. The lemma follows immediately since obviously whenever α 2 , for instance, (1) implies L it ÝÑ 0 surely.
In to prove the positive claims of Theorem 1 (that L it converges to one when α ¡ 2 )
we proceed by induction using the following three results. First a required notationDefinition 3: Let the random variable K it denote the number of pairs pz, z I q such that i's preferred outcome in tz i , z I i u has been revealed. Lemma 4: Consider the 1 player role. Suppose α ¡ 2 . Then, for each ξ p0, 1 s there is a sequence of random variables tθ 1 t pξqu such that
for all t ¥ 1 , where each tθ 1 t pξqu is non-increasing between arrival dates, and converges in probability to a function θ 1 pξq, which converges to zero as ξ approaches zero.
Lemma 5: Consider a fitness type i I. Suppose α ¡ 2 . Suppose further that for each ξ p0, 1 s there is a sequence of random variables tθ it pξqu such that
for all t ¥ 1 , where each tθ it pξqu is non-increasing between arrival dates, and converges in probability to a function θ i pξq, which converges to zero as ξ approaches zero. Then tL it u converges to one in probability.
Lemmas 4 and 5 together imply that, if α ¡ 2 , then, for player role 1, L 1 t converges to one in probability. Theorem 1 then follows by induction from the next claim.
Lemma 6: Consider a fitness type i ¡ 1 . Suppose α ¡ 2 . Suppose further that L jt converges to one in probability for each j ¤ i ¡ 1 . Then, for each ξ p0, 1 s there is a sequence of random variables tθ it pξqu, non-increasing between arrival dates, such that
for all t ¥ 1 , where each tθ it pξqu converges in probability to a function θ i pξq, which converges to zero as ξ approaches zero.
That is, if L jt converges to one in probability for each j i ¤ I. Then, in the limit, the probability of revealing new information about i preferences is small only if the fraction of extant knowledge about i preferences, L it , is close to one. 18
A.1.1. Proof of Lemma 6.
The proof of Lemma 4, which is a special case of Lemma 6 except for its focus on the 1 player role in particular, goes through with slight modifications to the notation developed here for the i ¡ 1 players. Thus, Lemma 6 will be proved directly but not Lemma 4. For the remainder of this section fix a player role i ¡ 1 .
We focus on dominance-solvable i player subgames. Rather than keep track of all of these, fix two end-nodes of the i player extensive form and consider subgames in which particular outcomes are available at these nodes. In particular, enumerate the terminal nodes of the i subtree as follows. Fix distinct actions a 1 , a 2 A. Name 18 Indeed, the probability of revealing new information about i is clearly small whenever 1 ¡ Lit is small. The converse is not as obviously true. Lemma 6, however, provides an appropriate bound. It decomposes EpKit 1 | Htq ¡Kit into a factor of 1 ¡Lit, which accounts
for information yet to be revealed about i preferences, and a residual θitpξq. The residual arises for two reasons-from i-type subgames in which i player choice does not reveal information because it is unclear what i players believe about the remaining players' choices, and because of outcomes that are avoided by the remaining opponents, making it difficult to reveal information about i's preferences over those outcomes.
"one" an end-node reachable after i chooses a 1 , and label "two" one of the end-nodes reachable after i chooses a 2 . Enumerate the remaining end-nodes "3 " through "A i " in some fixed way. Definition 4: Let Q i pz, z I q be the set of i player subgames with outcome z appended to "one", and z I appended to "two" that satisfy additionally the following. For each game in Q i pz, z I q the i ¡ 1 player subgames following i's choice of a 1 and a 2 are dominance-solvable (uniquely) resulting in z, and z I , respectively, and moreover one of the actions a 1 , a 2 is uniquely dominant for the i players themselves. 19 Definition 5: Let Q it denote all the i player subgames possible in period t, 20 and denote by Q ¦ it Q it the subgames for which all 1 , . . . , i ¡ 1 player preferences have been revealed along H t .
Definition 6: Let the random variable N it denote pairs of outcomes pz, z I q available in period t for which i's favored among z and z I has not been revealed along H t .
Suppose a subgame q Q i pz, z I qQ ¦ it is reached, with z i ¡ z I i . By A4 every i player there will choose a 1 , and moreover, every ToM observer will know that every i player chose a 1 . By the definition of Q i pz, z I q Q ¦ it , the backward induction outcomes of the subgames following a 1 and a 2 are common knowledge among ToM players. Every ToM can then infer that z i ¡ z I i , since if it were the case that z i ¤ z I i , a positive fraction of the ToM s in role i would have chosen some a $ a 1 rather than a 1 . It follows then that if pz, z I q N it and the i players in period t reach a subgame in Q i pz, z I qQ ¦ it , their choice there reveals new information about their preferences. The fraction of i subgames, among those in Q it , where i choice reveals new information about i preferences is then bounded below by°N
The set of games at date t is just the T -times product of Z t , and each game is drawn uniformly from this set. The empirical distribution over games realized at date t can then be replicated by drawing A I¡i i-player subgames uniformly and independently from Q it . There are A I¡i i player decision nodes. Therefore,
Consider now some additional required notation.
19 In proving Lemma 4, since there is no subsequent player after the 1 fitness type, define Q ¦ 1 pz, z I q as the 1 player subgames with z available at a1 and z I at a2 , where player 1's are not indifferent between z and z I .
20 Qit can be identified with the A i times product of Zt.
Definition 7: Let Z, and Z t denote the rA i ¡ 2 s-times product of Z, and Z t , respectively. Bold letters x, z, etc., denote elements of Z. Define Zpz, z I q Z as follows. The tuple of outcomes x px 1 , . . . , x r q Zpz, z I q if and only if the subgame with z at node "one", z I at node "two", x 1 at "three", ..., x r at node A i , is in Q i pz, z I q. Define then the functions E t pz, z I q |Z i pz, z I q Z t |{|Z t |, and Epz, z I q
Since each i player subgame has
Write Spξq tpz, z I q Z ¢ Z : Epz, z I q ξu , and let
Equations (2) and (3) yield
The terms Epz, z I q, E t pz, z I q and |Q it | are constant in between arrival dates; |Q ¦ it | is non-decreasing. We thus define the random variable θ it pξq from the claim,
Lemma 1 implies |Spξq tZ t ¢ Z t u |{|Z t | 2 converges to ³ Spξq f pzqfpz I qdzdz I , which tends to zero as ξ approaches zero (recall A2). Furthermore, if L jt ÝÑ 1 in probability, then |Q it zQ ¦ it |{|Q it | ÝÑ 0 in probability. With that in mind set θ i pξq from the claim to ³ Spξq f pzqfpz I qdzdz I . The claim is then established by the following result. Proof. We rely on the result from Potscher and Prucha [7] Suppose E t almost surely converges pointwise to E on Z ¢Z. If E is continuous, and if the sequence E t is almost surely asymptotically uniformly equicontinuous on Z ¢ Z, then E t almost surely converges uniformly to E on Z ¢ Z.
The required asymptotically uniform equicontinuity condition is:
where we use Bpz, z I , ηq to denote the open ball tpz, z I q Z ¢ Z : ρppz, z I q, px, x Iηu . By Lemma 1 E t pz, z I q almost surely converges pointwise to Epz, z I q. A2 gives Epz, z I q continuous. We complete the proof by verifying (5).
Define the set Zpz, z I , ηq Z t such that x Zpz, z I , ηq if and only if for every coordinate x of x, both min iI |x i ¡ z i | ¥ η, and min iI |x i ¡ z I i | ¥ η. Then, for each pz, z I q Z ¢ Z, and each px, x I q Bpz, z I , ηq,
Lemma 1 implies U t pz, z I , ηq almost surely converges uniformly to 
A2 ensures the limit converges to zero as η ÝÑ 0 .
A.1.2. Proof of Lemma 5.
Fix a preference type i I and assume the hypotheses of the lemma. In the remainder we suppress the i subscripts whenever it is possible to do so without confusion.
The proof is given in two parts. The first shows that L t converges in probability to a random variable L. The second establishes that L equals one a.e. In order to establish the convergence of L t we show that when α ¡ 2 these processes belongs to a class of generalized sub-martingales with the sub-martingale convergence property. In particular, we use the following definition and result in this connection [ (Egghe, 1984) , Definition VIII.1.3 and Theorem VIII.1.22].
w-submil Convergence: The adapted process pL t , H t q is a weak sub-martingale in the limit (w-submil) if almost surely, for each η ¡ 0 , there is a n such that
Part 1: L t converges in probability to a random variable L. In view of the w-submil convergence result we show that tL t u is a w-submil under the hypotheses of Lemma 5. As first step we prove that the arrival date subsequence tL t k u is a w-submil. Toward that end, consider consecutive arrival dates t ¦ , τ ¦ , with
Then, by the hypotheses of the result being proved, for each ξ p0, 1 s,
The third line uses the fact that L t is non-decreasing between arrival dates, that θ it pξq is non-increasing between arrival dates (see the definition of θ it pξq in the statement of Claim 5).
Combining equations (7) and (8), and using the fact that
surely, yields-after some algebra-
The left-hand-side of (9) surely converges to 1 ¡ θ it pξq for each ξ p0, 1 s. To see this note that |Z t ¦| 2 {|Z τ ¦| 2 ÝÑ surely converges to one, and observe that if t ¦ is the arrival date of the k-th new outcome then
which surely converges to zero when α ¡ 2 .
In the remainder hatted variables will be used to denote variables sampled at arrival
We use (9) to prove the following. For each η ¡ 0 there exists an M such that for all arrival dates t m , t n , such that n ¡ m ¥ M ,
(10)
To that end suppose for some m and n, that n ¡ m, EpL n |Ĥ m q L m . Since
there is at least one k, with m ¤ k n¡1 , such that EpL k 1 |Ĥ m q EpL k |Ĥ m q. Let r be the largest integer in tm, , . . . , n ¡ 1 u for which this is the case, i.e., EpL k 1 |Ĥ m q ¥ EpL k |Ĥ m q, for each k r 1 , . . . , n ¡ 1 . According to (9) EpL r 1 |Ĥ m q ¡ EpA tr pξq |Ĥ m q.
Hence,
Now, recall that A t pξq converges surely to 1 ¡θ it pξq which, by the hypothesis of the claim, converges in probability to 1 ¡ θ i pξq. We can then choose an arrival M large enough so that 
By assumption θ i pξq converges to zero as ξ approaches zero. Hence (10) can be obtained by choosing ξ so that θ i pξq η{2 and thus tL k u is a w-submil.
Having established that tL k u is a w-submil, it remains to show that tL t u is also a w-submil. Consider any dates t and τ where t τ. Then
everywhere, when t ¦ is the first arrival date after t and τ ¦ is the greatest arrival date less than or equal to τ. Since tL k u is a w-submil and each |L t | bounded above by 1, the w-submil convergence result implies L τ ¦ ¡ L t ¦ ÝÑ 0 in probability. Furthermore,
Hence the right-hand side of the last indented expression converges to zero in probability establishing that tL t u is a w-submil.
Part 2: L t converges to one in probability. Let L denote the limit, in probability, of L t . By the hypotheses of Lemma 5,
It is straightforward to show that
for all ξ p0, 1 s. By assumption θ i pξq tends to zero as ξ approaches zero, implying Ep1 ¡ Lq 0 , and thus L 1 a.e.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2.
Recall A2 describing the cdf F on the payoff space rm, M s I and the implied cdf for games given by G, on the payoff space rm, M s IT .
Definition 8: Let µ denote the measure on games induced by F . In particular, for each measurable S Q, µpSq ³ qS dGpqq. Let µ t denote the corresponding empirical measure. That is, µ t pSq |S Q t |{|Q t |.
We establish the result of Theorem 2 by showing that the ratio of the population of any alternative type to that of the SPE-ToM type tends to zero in probability. 22 If the alternative type is a ToM type that differs from SPE-ToM only a set of µ measure zero, it should simply be identified with SPE-ToM. It also follows that µpSq ¡ 0 wherē S is the set of games for which player role i has no dominant choice at any node. 23 However, the set of games for which player role i has a dominant choice at some but not all nodes also has positive µ measure. For simplicity, we then rule out the possibility that the alternative ToM type differs from SPE-ToM with positive probability only on this set and agrees with it with probability one onS.
We recall a key hypothesis of Theorem 2-A5: For each i ¡ 1 , every alternative i ToM type differs from the SPE-ToM at every i decision node in a set of games S with positive µ measure.
That is, in the limit, the alternative type will differ from the SPE-ToM on a set of games that occur with positive probability. What about the naive alternative types? Any such naive type differs from the SPE-ToM type onS given that the game is new. That the game is new will be assured with probability that tends to one, so we effectively assign S S in this conditional sense.
For the remainder fix a player role i 1 and fix one alternative type to the SPE-ToM in role i.
Definition 9: Let the random variable R it be the fraction of the population in player role i that is SPE-ToM.
The proof of Theorem 2 is by induction on i. It follows from A4 that R 1 t 1 is satisfied vacuously. The result is then established by proving that if R jt ÝÑ 1 , in probability, j 1 , ..., i ¡ 1 , then R it converges in probability to one. Assume then in what follows that R jt ÝÑ 1 , in probability, j 1 , ..., i ¡ 1 .
Consider some prerequisites.
Definition 10: The random variable I t pδq t0, 1 u is such that I t pδq 1 if and only if the game drawn at date t belongs to the set Q δ , where Q δ is the set of games where the minimum absolute payoff difference for any pair of outcomes, for any player is greater than δ ¥ 0 .
22 Recall there is a finite number of types. 23 This follows since any game with a dominant choice at some node for i can be mapped to a game for which this is not true by swapping an outcome in the dominant set of outcomes with an outcome that is not in this set. The restrictions that define Q δ are measurable, so Q δ itself is measurable. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 that P tI t pδq 1 | H t u almost surely converges to µpQ δ q. Similarly, Lemma 1 implies if the alternative type is a ToM type, then P tD t 1 | H t u almost surely converges to µpSq. Definition 12: The random variable J t pεq t0, 1 u is such that J t pεq 1 if and only if 1) all 1 , . . . , i ¡ 1 player preferences in the game drawn at t have been revealed to the ToM types; and 2) at each role i ¡ 1 decision node that can be reached by role i, the fraction of resulting play that reaches an SPE outcome in that subgame is at least
As a key ingredient in the proof consider the following result. Proof. Fix a date t. Assume I t p0q 1 , since this is required in each of the three claims. Let zphq then be the unique SPE payoff in the continuation game defined by the i role information set h, at date t. Let mphq be the measure of players that reach the i role information set h at date t.
Consider i). Since J t pεq 1 , at most a fraction ε of any i player cognitive type is matched with remaining players that do not behave as in the unique pure SPE. When matched with these non-SPE remaining players, the alternative type's expected payoff is at most M . Since D t 1 , by assumption, the alternative type chooses differently from the SPE-ToM at every i information set. The ratio of the expected payoff of the alternative type to that of the SPE-ToM is then at most Consider now ii). Assume the alternative is a naive type. Define the random variable A t such that A t 1 if the game drawn at date t is new, and let A t 0 otherwise. Let B t equal one if the game realized at t has no dominant strategy for role i at any i information set; let B t be one otherwise. For any indicator functions A and B,
EpA t q is just Ep1 ¡γ t q, where γ t is the fraction of games played previously among those available at date t. Whenever α T , γ t surely converges to zero (Theorem 1 Claims 3 and 4 (using also (13) and the fact that µpQ δ q converges to one as δ tends to zero) then give that
in probability.
We can choose ε ¡ 0 and δ ¡ 0 so that This completes the proof of Theorem 2 since for such ε and δ, we have shown ln rτ τ is bounded above, in the limit, in probability, by a negative constant. Hence r τ ÝÑ 0 , in probability.
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In this experiment you will participate in a series of two person decision problems. The experiment will last for a number of rounds. Each round you will be randomly paired with another individual.
The joint decisions made by you and the other person will determine how much money you will earn in that round.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We will not tell anyone else your earnings. We ask that you do not discuss your earnings with anyone else.
If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand.
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You will see a diagram similar to one on your screen at the beginning of the experiment. You and another person will participate in a decision problem shown in the diagram.
One of you will be Person 1 (orange). The other person will be Person 2 (blue). In the upper left corner, you will see whether you are Person 1 or Person 2.
You will be either a Person 1 or a Person 2 for the entire experiment.
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Notice the four pairs of squares with numbers in them; each pair consists of two earnings boxes. However, for each amount that you earn, the amount the other person earns is fixed. In other words, for each amount that Person 1 sees, there is a corresponding, unique amount that will always be shown to Person 2.
For example, suppose Person 1 sees an earnings box containing "12" in round 1. In the same pair, suppose Person 2 sees "7". Then, at any later round, anytime Person 1 sees "12", Person 2 will see "7".
Together, you and the other person will choose a path through the diagram to an earnings box.
We will describe how you make choices next.
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A node, displayed as a circle and identified by a letter, is a point at which a person makes a decision. Notice that the nodes are color coded to indicate whether Person 1 or Person 2 will be making that decision. You will always have two options.
If you are you Person 1 you will always choose either "Right" or "Down", which will select a node at which Person 2 will make a decision.
If you are Person 2 you will also choose either "Right" or "Down" which will select a pair of earnings boxes for you and Person 1.
Once a pair of earnings boxes is chosen, the round ends, and each of you will be able to review the decisions made in that round.
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In each round all pairs will choose a path through the same set of nodes and earnings boxes. This is important because at the end of each round, in addition to your own outcome, you will be able to see how many pairs ended up at each other possible outcome.
While you review your own results from a round, a miniature figure showing all possible paths through nodes and to earnings boxes will be displayed on the right hand side of the screen.
The figure will show how many pairs chose a path to each set of earnings boxes.
The Payoff History table will update to display your payoff from the current period.
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We have provided you with a pencil and a piece of paper on which you may write down any information you deem relevant for your decisions. At the end of the experiment, please return the paper and pencil to the experimenter.
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly choose 2 rounds for payment, and your earnings from those rounds will be summed and converted to $CAD at a rate of 1 Experimental Dollar = $2.
Important points:
Each round you will be randomly paired with another person for that round.
Person 1 always makes the first decision in a round.
Person 1's payoff is in the orange earnings box and Person 2's in the blue earnings box.
Each person will only be able to see the numbers in their own earnings box.
Earnings always come in unique pairs so that for each amount observed by Person 1, the number observed by Person 2 will be fixed.
In a given round, all pairs will choose a path through the same set of nodes and earnings boxes.
After each round you will be able to see how many pairs ended up at each outcome.
We will choose 2 randomly selected periods for payment at the end of the experiment.
Any questions?
C. Screenshots Figure C1 : Screenshot for Player 1. This figure shows the screen as player 1 sees it prior to submitting his choice of action. The yellow highlighted node indicates that player 1 has provisionally chosen the corresponding action, but the decision is not final until the submit button is clicked. While waiting for player 1 to choose, player 2 sees the same screen except that she is unable to make a decision, provisional choices by player 1 are not observable, and the "Submit" button is invisible. Figure C2 : Screenshot for Player 2. This figure shows the screen as player 2 sees it after player 1 has chosen an action. Here, player 1 chose to move down, so the upper right portion of the game tree is no longer visible.
While player 2 is making a decision, player 1 sees an identical screen except that he is unable to make a decision and the "Submit" button is invisible. Table F1 : Observed Probability of Outcomes by Session.
Each entry is a probability that we observed a particular outcome in a particular session. Pairs SPE refers to the probability that a pair ended at the SPE. P1 SPE is the probability that player 1's choice was consistent with the SPE. P1 Heur is the probability that Player 1 chose in a manner consistent with the "highest mean" rule of thumb (heuristic). P1 SPE | heur $ SPE is the probability that player one followed the SPE when it did not correspond to the "highest mean" rule of thumb. P1 SPE | heur SPE is the probability that player one followed the SPE when it did correspond to the "highest mean" rule of thumb. P1 SPE | No Heur is the probability that player 1 followed the SPE when the rule of thumb was inapplicable (i.e. equal means). P2 Dom is the probability that player 2 chose the dominant strategy. P2 SPE | P1 SPE is the conditional probability of player 2 choosing the dominant strategy given that player 1 followed the SPE. Sessions are labeled in the format # of Payoffs -# of Subjects -Session ID so that 7-10-2 corresponds to the 2nd session with 7 payoff pairs and 10 subjects.
